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Interview with Fred Brooks on “Building Effective
Large-Scale Requirements”
The Design Science perspective remains by no means undisputed. One of its most
outspoken critics is Turing Award Winner Fred Brooks, manager of one of the largest early
software projects in the 1960’s and author of some of the most inﬂuential early software
engineering studies, including his classic book “The Mythical Man Month”. Frederick Phillips
Brooks, Jr. is a software engineer and computer scientist. He received the A.B. in Physics
from Duke University in 1953, and the Ph.D. in Computer Science from Harvard University
in 1956. Working with the IBM Corporation from 1956 to 1965, he was an architect of the
Stretch and Harvest computers and then was Project Manager for the development of IBM’s
System/360 family of computers and OS/360 software. In 1964, Brooks founded the
Department of Computer Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and
chaired it for 20 years. Currently, he is Kenan Professor of Computer Science.
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Lyytinen: One of the reasons we
wanted to converse with you in this special issue on requirement engineering
(RE) is that much of the RE literature
makes an assumption that fixed requirements are absolutely vital for design success. We know that you are critical of
some of the assumptions underlying this
model. So why do you think that it is a
problematic model?
Brooks: In my experience, two things
happen. One is that requirements change
during the process of building any complicated system, because the outside
world changes. Secondly, one discovers
requirements that one did not know existed even at the beginning of a project.
I often quote from a study report done
by an Air Force Science Board Committee
on requirements. They say that the notion that you need to have your requirements done before you do Milestone A is
wrong. What you really want to do is to
set your overall goals by Milestone A and
then develop the requirements by Mile191
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stone B, as you do the design. The problem comes not so much from attempting
to get requirements as from the notion
that you can develop a complete and binding list of requirements.
In the classical Waterfall Model, there
is only one level of feedback from each
next level down. Thus if you follow that
process – and I have been through it several times – you come out with a list
of requirements that nobody knows how
much it will cost to meet – cost in performance, or cost in dollars, or cost in
schedule. All the stakeholders pile requirements on at the start. The Air Force
Study Board report was very interesting
in one respect. It pointed out that it is
now taking 15 years to develop a substantial military system; 25 years ago it
was taking 5 years, and the difference is
the process. In those five-year systems,
they started with some very firm goals
and very firm leaders, but not with very
firm detailed requirements. Those were
worked out during development.
I am an advocate for Barry Boehm’s
spiral model, in which you do some feasibility analysis, you do some design, you
do some requirements development, you
iterate, and you test things on each iteration. You build prototypes as soon as you
can.
In the literature, unfortunately, prototyping is seen principally as a means
of evaluating user interface requirements,
whereas in fact prototyping is important
for evaluating function as well.
Hansen: The insight from the Air Force
Study Board regarding the dramatic extension in the timeline is quite striking.
Is your perception that we have moved
backward by putting formal process in
place?
Brooks: The whole agile movement
starts with the assumption that our development processes got much too heavy
and too complicated, and therefore too
slow; that we wanted to move to a model
in which one builds stuff early and tests
it continually – not continuously, continually – with use and user feedback. I think
that is exactly right. Harlan Mills proposed this back in 1971. Consider a realtime system where you have a cycle of
some sort. You want to build that basic backbone and “stub” out all the functions. Then one by one put function in,
try it on a user, refine it, and then flesh
out another stub. As soon as you have
something useful to the user, really deliver it and really start getting feedback
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from the field. That is also essentially
what the agile movement is now saying.
Lyytinen: To what degree do you think
that this an outcome of the fact that, because of cost reasons and many other
things, you have very formal tendering
and contracting processes and in order to
do that you have to have so-called full requirements specifications?
Brooks: I think that is a big part of
the problem. Indeed, I have a chapter in
my book, The Design of Design, coming
out this month that is called “Requirements, Sin, and Contracts”. The argument is that people need formal contracts
to protect them from cheating each other,
intentionally or unintentionally, and the
formal contracts lead to stating requirements too soon. Then, that may lead to
a strategy on the part of the unscrupulous to low-ball on the initial formal contract and then make it up on the change
orders. I notice that in buildings that is
not what is done. You give the architect
a rough set of goals. The architect comes
back with a program, which is essentially
a statement of requirements. That is iterated with the user. Then the architect
does a conceptual design that is iterated
with user, using drawings and models.
One does not let the construction contract until the design is complete. I think
the mistake we make often in software engineering is insisting that the contract be
let before there is a design. That is a serious error.
Hansen: You mention that we freeze
the requirements too soon. Do you think
there is a “right” timeline for freezing?
Brooks: No, I do not believe there is a
point at which you have a complete and
final set of requirements. I once worked
on a central payroll program for 40 states.
Just because of what the 40 state legislatures were doing, the externally imposed requirements were changing all the
time. If we look at many software systems
that have various kinds of input-output
devices, the technologies change all the
time – the world keeps changing around
you. It is crucial to have a process that
is flexible to change in requirements. It
must also respond to costs and difficulties encountered in development.
The other factor is that for any successful system the scope of usage is going to be enlarged way beyond what you
expected. Thus there will be added requirements as people adapt the system
to new functions. They will discover that
to adapt it really neatly it ought to have
some other capabilities. For example, as

we discovered with building a new Computer Science building, lo and behold it
accommodates really nicely conferences
up to 125 people without interfering with
normal activities. In any modification to
the building it has newly become a requirement not to undo that capability.
So the process of changing requirements
goes on not only in the entire development process but for the entire product
lifetime. The concept of a fixed requirement time is a gross approximation that
misleads us.
Lyytinen: So, how much do you have
to pay attention to the fact that requirements may change over time? One could
also argue that sometimes this change is
outside of your control. There are many
drivers, which influence the level at which
you have to pay attention?
Brooks: An experience I had with a
house design is that we discovered a requirement quite later on, while running
use cases against a set of drawings – a requirement that we had never thought
about before. We have meetings of 40
people here – where do they put their
coats? We had not thought about that
one. It turned out to be a little trigger
on a big decision that already had many
pros and cons. That requirement caused
us to flip the whole house end for end.
Well, that was quite a surprise. You might
say “You should run all possible use cases
ahead of time”, but you cannot do that.
As one designs, one starts looking at prototypes – such as drawings or physical
models or Wizard of Oz prototypes (I am
taking “prototype” to be very abstract
and general here). As you start running
more and more detailed use cases against
them you discover things that you need
that you did not realize you needed.
Sooner or later, if you are going to enter a fixed price contract, you do have to
settle on a set of specifications, but notice
that, as I say, in the building industry that
fixed set of requirements is prepared after
the architect has completed the design.
Lyytinen: Another danger that some
people point out is requirements paralysis. That you just do too much requirements specification. Are there examples
where you might be investing too much
time on requirements?
Brooks: Well, I have seen two cases.
With OS/360, the marketing organization
put together a requirements group and
they came up with a long and ridiculous
list. As project manager I just had to finally say, “We are not going to do that.”
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In another case, when I was on the
Defense Science Board I was called on
to review, along with a Marine general
who had spent his life in military aviation, the plans for a light attack helicopter. While a colonel was briefing us
at the Pentagon he said without changing his tone of voice, “And it has to ferry
itself across the Atlantic.” It what? I do
not know anything about helicopter design, but I know enough about design to
know that you cannot do that without
giving up some other attributes. Naturally the General and I both asked, “Why
does it have to do that?” Because, when
you think about it, a helicopter only has
do that twice in its life if you are lucky,
and once if you are not. The answer was,
“We do not have enough C-5 transport
aircraft to carry them all.” So we said,
“Well, why not take some of the total program money and buy a few more C-5s?”
“Oh we cannot do that” was the response.
In other words, that was not bureaucratically possible. So somebody had put this
unfortunate design requirement on the
helicopter. (The project eventually died.)
Then we inquired about the requirements process. There had been a committee representing the different user
communities. As far as we could determine there was neither a helicopter engineer nor a pilot on that committee. So
who were they? There were representatives of the various user organizations,
in other words, fundamentally paperpeople. They had talked to their constituencies; each constituency had stated
what they wanted. There was the usual
log rolling – “I will not naysay your requirement if you will not naysay my requirement.” So consequently nobody had
said, “This requirement does not make
any sense. There is bound to be a better
solution to how to get them to Europe
than that.” That was a very vivid example to me, even though it was outside my
area of competence, of how the requirements process can get detached from the
design process and lead you to this long,
long list of unreasonable requirements.
Well, I think our industry has somewhat moved away from that notion of a
long list of pre-specified requirements –
that you do all that before you start design – at least I hope it has. So the question of “Is it possible to spend too much
time and too much effort getting requirements before you do anything else?” can
be answered with YES. Now, does that
mean that you do not do as careful an
elicitation of initial requirements as you
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can? Of course not. Surely you do that,
but you have to have a process that assumes that the process is not absolutely
right, and absolutely not final.
Lyytinen: Based on your experiences,
what are the biggest challenges in capturing and managing the requirements so
that they are really useful and sensible for
many different stakeholders?
Brooks: I think the biggest challenge is
getting a unified overall vision of what
it is you are trying to do, as opposed
to many fragmented personal visions. So,
your next question is then, “How do you
do that?” And frankly, I do not know a
general solution. That is a chief function
of a project leader.
Lyytinen: How did you try to do that
yourself with the IBM/360 project?
Brooks: Well, I had two different System/360 experiences of course – the hardware one and the software one. In the
hardware case, the Spread committee
spent six weeks in a motel in Connecticut
with representatives from every division
of the company – marketing, the military
systems division, the World Trade company, as well as the different divisions that
built I/O gear and processors, etc. What
we hammered out was a vision of a single new product line replacing the six that
we had. Those were all running out of
architectural gas, namely address space.
So, as part of hammering out the product
strategy, we developed a technical vision.
As a matter of fact I wrote the document
of 40 technical ground rules for the new
computers that summarized our vision.
It was a short document – two or three
pages for 40 rules. Now, we understood
that the requirements were to cover the
entire computer performance and configuration range from little to big, with
strict program compatibility, so that was
the first overall objective. The next overall objective was that the system had to be
effective across all different applications.
Another crucial one was we were going to
make this out of a technology that cost
about half as much and we needed to
keep the company revenue at least where
it was, and indeed, grow it. So, we had
to be able to create new applications and
markets to more than double the amount
of computing that people wanted. Those
are quite clear objectives.
With the software, we had the opportunity because of the compatible hardware to say we can build one software
package to support all of the System/360
hardware systems and configurations. We
did not achieve that completely, but
3|2010

we did go a long way towards it. We
knew both the existing applications and
the new communications-based applications that we had to satisfy. We knew
the languages we had to support – ALGOL, COBOL, FORTRAN, report program generator, assembler, etc. We knew
that the operating systems had to support a new vision – that the operating
system is in control rather than the human operator. That was an entirely new
vision; nobody had really done that before. We also planned to provide multiprogramming, another new capability.
So the overall vision was a disk-based
system, a multi-programmable system,
an application-broad system, a languagebroad system, a performance-broad system configurable for different memory
sizes from 16 K up to 500 K at least.
Thus we had a few very clear overall broad objectives and we tried to
keep those forefront, just as the Air
Force committee described for successful weapon programs. At one point, when
the programming house was entirely separate from the System/360 development
project, the programming house came
back with a software support plan that
had four different incompatible operating systems. You would have to recompile your program as your configuration grew and you changed memory sizes
or processors, even though they were
strictly binary compatible. From an overall project point of view I said, “That is
unacceptable! The overall vision was one
of smooth customer growth; this violates
the overall vision.” We scrapped a year’s
worth of work and started over. But that
is the advantage of having very few, very
clear overall objectives. Those constitute
a unified vision.
Lyytinen: Is there anything new that
we have to do now compared to what
you had to do in earlier development
projects?
Brooks: I think we have a clearer perception that the tail is long. When we were
doing the /360 hardware, we predicted
that the architecture would last 25 years.
We are now at 45 years today, and System/z is newly out there and still executing an upward version of the same architecture. I thought I was being bold in estimating 25 years, because of course the
implementations turn over every four to
five years. The notion that an architecture
has to last and last is now clearer for us.
For example, look at the current FAA air
traffic control system. It has been in place
193
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since the early 1960s and they are still designing the next one.
Hansen: Why do think that is the case?
Is it a question of path dependence?
Brooks: The effort of re-doing a system
is so much bigger than expected. The effort is not just the cost of redoing, it is the
cost of retraining everybody that is going
to use it or maintain it. I was interested to
find out that as recently as five years ago
there was still an IBM vacuum tube 650
in productive service in Germany. Well,
you know it was doing a job. So the value
has just persisted. The lifetimes we are
talking about are much longer than we
expected, and the maintenance tail of a
successful project is much longer than we
expected. I think that is a realization that
has dawned on us bit by bit.
I think another one that has dawned on
us – well, I remarked on it in 1975 in “The
Mythical Man-Month”, but I think we appreciate it more and more – and that is
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the notion that a successful product attracts new applications and the new applications in turn call for added function
and added performance. So, this virtuous
cycle with a successful product can go on
and on. Now, it can go on and on ridiculously. Look at Microsoft Word and the
number of different options and functions in it, which is ludicrous. It is not
clear that what improved over the years
is ease of use.
Lyytinen: Do you have any closing
thoughts?
Brooks: The most important single
message I can leave you with is that great
designs come from great designers and
not from great processes. What process
improvement does – and it is important –
is bringing up the floor of practice. It enables organizations by systematic methods and better processes to improve poor
practice towards average practice. What
process work does not do is to raise the

ceiling of project imagination and quality.
Ceiling raising comes from really gifted
people who are given opportunities and
authority to do great designs. I have investigated IS designs that have fan clubs.
Which of these emerged from normal
product processes, and which were developed outside of normal product processes? The striking thing is that most of
them were outside normal product processes. Such processes are designed for
development of follow-on products; they
work well for that.
That observation means that the most
important thing that a manager can do
is to find potential great designers and
grow that talent thoughtfully and systematically. Thus I would go back to a focus
on people and talent, as opposed to process. That is from a management point of
view, rather than a research point of view.
Lyytinen and Hansen: Thank You.
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